Historically, behavioral and related approaches to psychotherapy have embraced what may be regarded as first-order change strategies in dealing with clinical problems in which private experiences such as unwanted thoughts, feelings , bodily sensations, impulses , and memories are thought to be centrally involved (Hayes, 1987 (Hayes, , 1994 . While differing tactics have been employed depending upon the particular private events being targeted, all first-order change strategies have in common the objective of directly altering problematic private experiences. For example, the weakening of conditioned emotional responses through reciprocal inhibition traditionally has been cited as the operative process underlying the successful treatment of phobias by systematic desensitization (Wolpe, 1958) . Cognitive therapy of depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) likewise adopts a first-order changE3 strategy in attempting to change the content of purported depressoQlenic thoughts through cognitive restructuring.
In contrast to first-order change strategies, recent years have seen the emergence of a "new wave" of cogn itive and behavior therapies that
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place greater emphasis upon second-order change (Hayes, Masuda, Bisset, Luoma, & Guerrero, 2004) . This development includes such apparently diverse approaches as dialectical behavior therapy for borderline personality disorder (Linehan, 1993) , integrative behavioral therapy for distressed couples (Wheeler, Christensen, & Jacobson, 2001) , and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy to prevent depression relapse (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002) that, nevertheless, share the agenda of facilitating therapeutic change by altering the context within which private events function. Such contexts include those in which efforts are made to control, rationalize, and believe versus disbelieve unwanted thoughts and feelings rather than merely experiencing them.
From a radical behavioral perspective, private events are not regarded as causes for other behaviors (Zettle, 1990 ) and, as a result, do not need to be eliminated or controlled as first-order change strategies attempt to do to effect a change in overt behavior. For example, in the area of pain management, it may be unnecessary to first reduce painful sensations experienced by individuals with certain medical conditions in order to attain changes in overt behavior that are instrumental in improving their quality of life (Dahl, Wilson, & Nilsson, 2004) . Rather, altering the context or verbal-social contingencies that support a controlling relationship between pain and behavioral passivity may constitute a viable secondorder change strategy. In particular, verbal reports of pain may not be regarded as a "reason" for behavioral passivity and patients may be encouraged to accept painful sensations by "just noticing" them rather than attempting to minimize or eliminate pain before pursuing valuedirected goals.
Among emergent second-order change approaches, acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) has been most explicitly derived from a behavior analytic perspective on private events and related phenomena (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) . ACT is a verbal psychotherapy grounded philosophically in functional contextual ism (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Hayes, 1993; Hayes, Hayes, & Reese, 1988) that has the ongoing act-in-context as its core analytic unit (Pepper, 1942) . One major contextual factor that supports dysfunctional behavior appears to be human languaging itself within which painful sensations and related private events may be regarded as problematic because they are verbally evaluated as "bad" or "awful" (an instance of what is known as "cognitive fusion"), can be justified through reason-giving (Zettle & Hayes, 1986) , and commonly are held as causes for overt dysfunctional behaviors such as escape from and avoidance of situations and activities that result in pain.
A core dysfunctional process that ACT seeks to undermine that is thought to support diverse forms of psychopathology is that of experiential avoidance (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996) . Experiential avoidance entails a deliberate effort to alter the form or frequency of certain private experiences; such as unwanted thoughts, feelings, bodily sensations, images, memories, and the like; or the circumstances in which they occur. For instance, in the arena of pain management, individuals may curtail their range of activities to avoid coming into contact with resulting painful sensations. Although experiential avoidance appears to be somewhat successful in the short-term (e.g. , an attempt to suppress an unwanted thought), it ultimately appears to be dysfunctional and counterproductive (Wegner, 1994) and thus warrants therapeutic attention. Briefly stated , ACT attempts to weake n experiential avoidance and strengthen its alternative, psychological acceptance, through the use of experiential exercises, paradox, and metaphor within a special verbalsocial commun ity that is created within therapy. The interested reader is encouraged to consult Hayes, Strosahl, et al. (1999) for a more detailed exposition of ACT.
To date, research investigating the purported contributions of experiential avoidance to the initiation, maintenance, and/or exacerbation of other problematic behaviors has been necessarily limited by the lack of an accepted means of assessing it. Recently, however, the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes, Strosahl, et aI., 2004) has been developed as a preliminary self-report measure of experiential avoidance. Using the AAQ to assess individual differences in levels of experiential avoidance , Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert, and Spira (2003) reported findings supportive of its conceptualized role within an acceptance-based approach to psychopathology and its treatment. College students who scored at the extremes on the AAQ (at least one standard deviation above or below an aggregate mean) were subjected to inhalations of carbon dioxide-enriched air while instructed to either merely observe or actively inhibit any resulting unwanted feelings and sensations. As expected, participants who reported high levels of experiential avoidance reacted with greater levels of anxiety and distress, but not physiological arousal, compared to those scoring low on the AAQ. Pdso, individuals high in experiential avoidance reported greater levels of anxiety compared to their low avoidant counterparts when attempting to suppress versus merely observing unwanted sensations , suggesting that deliberate efforts to control feared reactions among individuals who are predisposed to do so exacerbates rather than diminishes their overall level of distress.
The major purpose of this study was to furthe lf investigate experiential avoidance as a potentially central pathogenic process and , in doing so, indirectly also further evaluate the construct validity of the AAQ as a purported measure of this process. Individuals displaying high versus low levels of experiential avoidance as assessed by the AAQ were compared in their reactions to and efforts to cope with pain induced by the cold pressor task (Hines & Brown, 1932) . In particular, it was expected that participants who indicated high levels of experiential avoidance, compared to the ir low avoidant counterparts, would be less tolerant of pain and be more likely to employ dysfunctional coping strategies that seek to control or provide an escape from the pain itself. Because the critical difference between the two groups was conceptualized to lie in their reactions to pain rather than in the nature of the pain itself, no significant differences were anticipated between them in their sensitivity to pain nor in the intensity of the pain experienced.
The context of induced pain was selected as a "preparation" or additional challenge within which to further study experiential avoidance for several reasons. For one, pain is generally an unwanted psychological experience that most individuals attempt to avoid or escape from when possible, even often under circumstances in which doing so results in greater painful, albeit delayed, consequences (e.g., postponing dental care). Secondly, the painful sensations induced by the cold pressor task, while unwanted, are distinctly different than those created by Feldner et al. (2003) during their carbon dioxide challenge (e.g., heart racing, sweaty palms, dizziness, etc.). Thus results that parallel theirs would provide additional support for the construct validity of the AAQ and further implicate experiential avoidance as a robust pathogenic process as suggested by Hayes et al. (1996) .
A third reason for selecting pain as an investigational context for this study is because of existing research that has evaluated the impact upon pain-related behaviors of acceptance-based inteNentions that seek to weaken experiential avoidance, or alternatively, foster emotional acceptance. Hayes, Bissett, et al. (1999) found that subjects encouraged to accept pain induced by the cold pressor tolerated it longer than individuals assigned to an attention-placebo condition or those instructed to employ strategies to control the pain (e.g., positive self-talk, controlled breathing, positive imagery, etc). More recently, an ACT-based inteNention has also shown promise in being applied to clinical as well as analogue pain (Dahl et aI., 2004) . Swedish workers who displayed chronic stress/pain received either medical treatment as usual by itself or in combination with ACT. Participants who received the combined inteNention expended fewer sick days and utilized fewer medical resources at both posttreatment and 6-month follow-up than those who received only usual medical treatment, despite no significant differences between the two conditions in levels of pain or stress. Although these two studies collectively suggest the viability of applying acceptance-based approaches to pain management, it should be noted that neither obtained nor analyzed possible associated changes in experiential avoidance as a process measure (e.g., Zettle, 2003) . Consequently, another purpose of this study was to begin to more explicitly relate the process of experiential avoidance to existing research on acceptance-based approaches to pain toleration and management.
A fourth and final reason for investigating the role of experiential avoidance in pain-related behaviors was because doing so also provided an opportunity to further explore the relationship between experiential avoidance as a generalized approach to responding to unwanted private events and strategies in coping with pain more specifically (DeGood, 2000) . In particular, research involving both induced (Geisser, Robinson, & Pickren , 1992) and clinical pain (Keefe et aI., 1987; Rosenstiel & Keefe, 1983) has consistently shown that catastrophizing and praying/hoping as coping strategies are associated with greater levels of psychological distress and higher levels of reported pain. Accordingly, it was anticipated that participants evidencing high levels of experiential avoidance would be more likely to report resorting to these approaches in coping with pain induced by the cold pressor task.
Method

Participants
Participants (N = 25) were selected from a larger sample (N = 76) of college students enrolled in psychology courses who completed the AAQ. Descriptive statistics for this larger sample (M = 33.29, SO = 6.93) were comparable to those reported by Feldner et al. (2003) for their college student participants. Because there was no difference in AAQ scores by gender, the same cutting-scores were used to select both male and female participants. Following the same procedure as Feldner et aI., participants (N = 14) who obtained AAQ scores falling at least one standard deviation below the mean (26 or below) were selected as a group reporting low levels of experiential avoidance. An opposing group displaying high levels of experiential avoidance was constituted by selecting participants (N = 11) who obtained AAQ scores falling at least one standard deviation above the mean of the larger sample (41 or above). The two groups did not differ significantly from each other in the gender distribution (10 females and 4 males vs. 7 females and 4 males), handedness (14 dextrals vs. 10 dextrals and 1 sinistral), nor age (23.1 vs. 21.6 years) of participants. All participants were treated in accordance with the "Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct" (American Psychological Association, 2002) and were screened to ensure that they were not afflicted with any health-related condition (e.g., Raynaud's disease) that would be exacerbated by participation in the cold pressor task.
Questionnaires
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ). The AAQ is a 9-item self-report measure of experiential avoidance (Hayes, Strosahl, et aI., 2004) . Respondents use a 7-point scale to rate "the truth ... as it applies to you" of statements designed to evaluate aspects of psychological acceptance (e.g., "I'm not afraid of my feelin~Js") versus experiential avoidance (e.g., "Anxiety is bad"). Total scores range from 9-63, with higher scores reflecting greater levels of experiential avoidance. Hayes et al. found that a single-factor solution provides the best model fit and that the scale displays an acceptable level of internal consistency (Cronbach alpha = .70). Additional psychometric properties of the AAQ appear to be adequate for its use in research. For example, as expected, higher AAQ scores were predictive of depression amon!~ clients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder receiving treatment at a partial hospital unit. Significant correlations between the AAQ and other purported measures of experiential avoidance such as the Dissociative Experiences Scale (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) and White Bear Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1"994) may be regarded as support for its construct and convergent validity.
Gaping Strategies Questionnaire (GSQ). The GSa was originally designed to assess seven different strategies (diverting attention, reinterpreting pain sensations, coping self-statements, ignoring pain sensations, praying/hoping, catastrophizing, and increasing behavioral activity) used by patients in coping with chronic pain (Keefe, Grisson, Urban, & Williams, 1990) . Respondents use a 0 ("never do that") to 6 ("always do that') rating scale to indicate to what degree they engage in 44 different activities to cope with pain. Each of the seven subscales has been shown to possess adequate levels of reliability with coefficient alphas ranging from . 71 (Rosenstiel & Keefe, 1983) to .89 (Keefe et aI., 1987) . A version of the csa modified by Geisser et al. (1992) for use with the cold pressor task was administered. Each of the activities and rating designations was phrased in the past tense such that participants were asked to rate coping strategies they employed while their hands were immersed in cold, icy water (i.e., "indicate how much you engaged in each activity to cope with pain during the cold pressor task"). Items that load on the increasing behavioral activity subscale were deleted (e.g., "I leave the house and do something .. . ") as well as two items from the praying/hoping subscale that seemed inappropriate to coping during the cold pressor task (i.e., "I know someday someone will be here to help me and it will go away for awhile" and "I have faith in doctors that someday there will be a cure for my pain"). The resulting 4-item version of the praying/hoping subscale was found to be adequately reliable (coefficient alpha = .80).
Pain-Related Measures
Measures of several pain-related behaviors were obtained during or immediately after presentation of the cold pressor task.
Threshold. Following the procedure of Geisser et al. (1992) , pain threshold was measured with a stopwatch as the length of immersion time until each participant reported "pain."
Tolerance. Pain tolerance was measured with a stopwatch as the total amount of time each participant's hand remained immersed in the water.
Endurance. Pain endurance was calculated by subtracting the threshold from the tolerance measure to reflect how long each partiCipant kept his or her hand immersed in the water after indicating it was painful.
Intensity. Immediately after removing their hand from the cold, icy water, participants were asked to rate the intensity of pain experienced during the cold pressor task by placing a vertical mark along a 100-mm visual analogue scale (where 0 mm = "no pain" and 100 mm = "worst possible pain").
Procedure
Prior to the presentation of the cold pressor task, participants were required to remove any wristwatches or other timepieces to prevent selfmonitoring of their tolerance during it. A clock was also absent from the room in which the task was presented. In order to minimize any individual differences in pretask hand temperature, seated participants were first asked to immerse their left hand in a container of water at 68°F for 2 min . Immediately afterwards, participants placed the! same (left) hand in an adjacent container of icy water maintained at a temperature of 40 of while the following instructions were delivered:
Please place your left hand into the icy water at least up to your wrist. Please say "painful" when the cold sensation first becomes painful to you and try to hold your hand in the water as long as possible. Although we would like you to try to hold your hand in the water as long as possible, the decision of when to remove it is entirely up to you.
An assistant seated behind the participant recorded the tolerance and threshold measures with a stopwatch. After 5 minutes of immersion, any participants who had not yet withdrawn thei r hand were asked to do so and their tolerance measures were recorded as 300 s. Immediately after discontinuation of the cold pressor task, participants completed the pain intensity scale followed by the csa.
Results
Descriptive statistics for each of the pain-related measures and subscales of the csa for the two groups of participants are presented in Table 1 . A series of t tests was conducted on these variables, using one-tailed tests of significance on those measures (pain tolerance and endurance) and csa subscales (praying/hoping and catastrophizing) that were expected a priori to differ between the two groups. Also reported in Table 1 are the results of these analyses as l/IIell as associated effect sizes (Cohen , 1977) . 
Pain-Related Measures
Threshold. As can be seen in Table 1 , participants low in experiential avoidance indicated experiencing pain after a little over a minute (62.5 s) of immersion in the cold, icy water. Their high avoidant counterparts, by comparison, averaged well under a minute (43.1 s), but this difference, as expected, was not significant.
Tolerance. As anticipated, participants low in experiential avoidance maintained immersion for a significantly longer period of time (over 2.5 min on average) than those high in experiential avoidance (slightly beyond a minute on average). If anything, the effect size (.77) associated with this difference may be underestimated because of a ceiling effect of requiring all participants to remove their hands from the icy water after 5 min. Over a third of the participants (5 of 14 = 36%) in the low avoidance group completed the entire cold pressor task versus only 1 of 11 participants from the high avoidance group.
Endurance. As expected, participants low in experiential avoidance also endured pain induced by the cold pressor for a significantly longer period of time than their high avoidant counterparts. After first reporting pain (threshold), low avoidant participants on average left their hand immersed in the water four times longer (101.3 vs. 25.1 s) than those high in experiential avoidance. This difference in all likelihood also would have been even greater had participants been allowed to continue the cold pressor task beyond the 5-min limit.
Intensity. Participants high in experiential avoidance rated the intensity of their pain during the cold pressor task as slightly greater than those low in avoidance. However, this difference, as anticipated, fell short of being statistically significant (p = .08).
CSQ Subscales
Consistent with what had been anticipated based upon previous research, the only significant differences noted among the CSQ subscales between the two groups were in their reported use of praying/hoping and catastrophizing as coping strategies during the cold pressor task. In particular, participants high in experiential avoidance indicated engaging in significantly more praying/hoping and catastrophizing than their low avoidant counterparts.
Discussion
The overall findings of this study were as expected in the light of previous research and conceptualizations of experiential avoidance. As anticipated, participants reporting low levels of experiential avoidance as assessed by the AAQ displayed significantly greater levels of pain tolerance and endurance during the cold pressor task than the high avoidance group. It is equally noteworthy that these findings occurred despite no differences between the two groups in their apparent sensitivity to pain as reflected primarily by the threshold and, to a lesser degree, pain intensity measures. A paper-and-pencil mEiasure of pain sensitivity (e.g., Osman, Barrios, Gutierrez, Kopper, Butler, & Bagge, 2003) was not included in this study as it was our belief that the threshold measure provided a more behaviorally valid and sensible index of pain sensitivity. Moreover, the same measure has also been used by other researchers (Lehofer, Liebman, Moser, & Schauenstein, 1998) to reflect pain sensitivity. However, to more thoroughly explore the possible relationship between pain sensitivity and experiential avoidance, it would seem useful to also include self-report measures of pain sensitivity in future research investigating both analogue and clinical pain.
The inability to attribute group differences in pain tolerance and endurance to corresponding differences in pain sensitivity and pain intensity roughly parallel similar findings between the avoidance of other private events, levels of those experiences, and sensitivities to them . For example, experiential avoidance as assessed by the AAa has been shown to be distinct from anxiety sensitivity (Stewart, Zvolensky, & Eiffert, 2001 ; Zvolensky & Forsyth, 2002) . Additionally, differences reported by Feldner et al. (2003) in affective distress between their low and high avoidance groups during carbon dioxide inhalation occurred in the absence of any significant difference between them in levels of physiological arousal. The cumulative research to date thus suggests that expected differences that have been obtained between low and high experientially avoidant participants in their response to challenges, sLlch as the cold pressor task and carbon dioxide inhalation, cannot be attributed to corresponding differences in sensitivity to private events induoed by these challenges. Nor does it appear that predicted differences can be accounted for by associated differences in the levels of unwantl ed private experiences. Further research investigating how low versus higlh experientially avoidant individuals respond to additional challenges that induce an even wider array of unwanted sensations would help determine the degree to which experiential avoidance constitutes a robust process.
Low avoidant participants in this study evidently tolerated induced pain for a significantly longer period of time not because they were less sensitive to pain nor because the discomfort they experienced was less intense, but because they reacted to pain differently than their counterparts high in experiential avoidance. In short, the key difference appeared to lie not in the pain itself, but in how participants related to it. The findings from the csa indicate that the high avoidance group reacted to pain induced by the cold pressor by catastrophizing and praying/hoping in a manner similar to that reported for other pain intolerant subjects (Geisser et aI., 1992) . What differentiated the coping strategies employed by low versus high avoidant participants was not that the former group resorted to behaviors not used by the latter, but that they, unlike their high avoidant counterparts, did not evidently engage in catastrophizing and praying/hoping.
It should be noted that the csa asked participants to retrospectively report strategies they used during the cold pressor task. Thus, additional research using a "talk aloud" procedure would be necessary to determine if such reports accurately reflect specific coping strategies participants actively use during the cold pressor task and the nature of any temporal relationship between catastrophizing and praying/hoping. One possibility is catastrophizing that occurs first exacerbates distress levels that are then reacted to by praying for escape/deliverance from such distress. Alternatively, participants may first resort to praying/hoping with catastrophizing occurring subsequently as a response to the failures of this coping strategy. An obvious limitation of this study and any extension of it that incorporates "talk aloud" procedures is that they are correlational in nature. Another tactic for better understanding, in particular, the impact of praying/hoping as an apparent form of experiential avoidance would be to study it experimentally by explicitly instructing participants to engage in it during the cold pressor task. In principle, a similar procedure could be employed with catastrophizing as well, although praying/hoping obviously possesses greater "face validity" as a coping strategy.
Whereas experiential avoidance is positively related to praying/ hoping as a strategy for coping with both induced and chronic pain, it would be both overly simplistic and of apparent limited utility to construe its opposite, acceptance, as the mere absence of such efforts to escape from pain. For one, although research may be required for verification, it seems doubtful that encouraging individuals experiencing either induced or chronic pain to "not pray or catastrophize" would have any beneficial impact on their ability to tolerate pain and/or lead a valued life in the face of it. Acceptance is more usefully viewed as an active choice to willingly make and remain in psychological contact with unwanted experiences rather than a passive resignation to tolerate them (Hayes, Strosahl, et aI., 1999) . Apart from the question of whether it is appropriate to regard acceptance as an alternative "coping strategy," it apparently represents a process that is not captured by the CSQ. McCracken and Eccleston (2003) recently reported only relatively weak relationships between an acceptance measure of chronic pain (Geiser, 1992) and, with the exception of praying/hoping, other coping strategies assessed by the CSQ. Moreover, the CSQ subscales were not reliably correlated with adjustment to chronic pain. By contrast, acceptance of chronic pain was associated with less pain , disability, depression , and pain-related anxiety, higher daily uptime, and better work status.
Insofar as this study examined the reaction of college students to induced acute pain, the direct implications of its findings to helping patients cope with clinical pain of a chronic nature would appear to be rather limited. However, in our view, the overall results may be seen as convergent with an accumulating body of research suggesting the viability of an acceptance-based approach to management of both analogue and clinical pain. In particular, our findings parallel those of McCracken and Eccleston (2003) who found that chronic pain patients who accept their pain experience a higher quality of life than those who engage in coping efforts designed to control or escape from it. Moreover, such correlational findings are also consistent with the impact of experimental efforts to foster acceptance of both induced (Hayes, Bissett, et al. 1999 ) and clinical pain (Dahl et aI., 2004) . Hayes et al. found that subjects encouraged to accept pain induced by the cold pressor tolerated it longer than those instructed to control it, while Dahl and her colleagues found that adding an acceptance-based intervention to routine mE~dical treatment resulted in significantly higher levels of adjustment among chronic pain patients. In short, it appears that the second-order strategy of learning how to live with pain may be more functional long term than the first-order strategy of attempting to learn how to live without it.
A final implication of our findings concerns the emerging construct validity of the AAQ. This study is the second to discover that participants respond to ostensibly unrelated challenges in similar and predictable ways as function of their level of experiential avoidance, suggesting that what the AAQ purports to assess represents a fairly robust process. It is noteworthy that none of the nine items on the instrument explicitly ask about reactions to physical pain per se, thEl closest item being "If I could magically remove all the painful experiences I've had in my life, I would do so." While it may be useful and ultimately prove necessary to develop measures that are more experientially specific (e.g., Geiser, 1992) , at present the type of acceptance assessed by the AAQ appears to be fairly dispositional in nature. Stated somewhat differently, there is empirical support for conceptualizing acceptance (at least as evaluated by the AAQ) as a possible functional response class in which individuals display a general tendency to either accept or, alternatively, actively attempt to avoid and escape from a wide array of unwanted private events. Additional research in which a series of challenges are presented to the same group of participants varying in thleir levels of experiential avoidance would help clarify, for example, if high avoidant individuals respond in a similar and predictable fashion when confronted with diverse unwanted experiences.
It should be underscored that the participants in this study and in that of Feldner et al. (2003) were a nonclinical (college student) population . For this reason, future research ideally should also iinclude partiCipants from clinical populations who report elevated levels of experiential avoidance to explore the degree to which it may constitute a functional response class that might account for comorbidity of certain clinically relevant behaviors. It is our hope that such continued and related research with both analogue and clinical populations may not only further our understanding of experiential avoidance as a putative core pathogenic process, but also ultimately enhance the ability of ACT and other acceptance-based interventions to alleviate various forms of human suffering.
